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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Derl H. Maurer (“Maurer”) pleaded guilty to 
a single count information charging him with possession of 
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(a)(5)(B).  The District Court imposed a sentence of 
sixty months of imprisonment and a five-year term of 
supervised release, which included special conditions 
restricting internet access and association with minors.  On 
appeal, Maurer challenges the procedural reasonableness of 
his sentence as well as the special conditions of his 
supervised release.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
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Maurer came to the attention of authorities on July 7, 
2009, after sending an email via an online social networking 
website to a fictitious eighteen-year-old teenager, (“Nate”), 
whose internet profile was created by undercover law 
enforcement officers to investigate crimes involving sexual 
exploitation of children.  In the email, Maurer solicited the 
exchange of nude images and asked “Nate” how old he was.  
The following day, Maurer sent another email again inquiring 
about nude pictures and reiterating his interest in “young guys 
too your age and under,” and stating “hope your into older 
men.”  (Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 10.)  Three images, 
which depicted a nude older man exposing himself, were 
attached to this email.  Thereafter, Maurer sent another email 
directing “Nate” to a website featuring pictures and videos of 
Maurer performing sexual acts.   
   
In response to a request transmitted by authorities 
through “Nate,” on or about July 13, 2009, Maurer mailed 
two compact disks (“CDs”) to a provided address.  The 
package containing the CDs included a handwritten note from 
Maurer describing the contents of the CDs, soliciting the 
trade of additional images, and expressing the desire to “meet 
and have some good fun together.”  (Id. ¶ 16.)  Upon 
inspection, law enforcement officers confirmed that the CDs 
contained numerous images and videos of child pornography.  
Based upon this information, the investigating officers 
obtained a search warrant to search and seize computers and 
videos from Maurer‟s residence.  
 
On July 23, 2009, law enforcement officers executed a 
search of Maurer‟s residence pursuant to the warrant.  Maurer 
admitted to authorities that he had sent the CDs to “Nate,” 
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that he had been viewing and collecting child pornography for 
six months, and that there was additional child pornography 
on his computer as well as a library of CDs in his bedroom 
closet.  He denied having any sexual contact with minors.  In 
total, law enforcement officers seized from Maurer‟s 
residence forty image files and nineteen video files containing 
child pornography.  An examination of these files revealed 
that several depicted adult males penetrating and otherwise 
sexually abusing prepubescent children, some of whom were 
bound with rope and tape.  (Id. ¶¶ 17, 20, 23.) 
 
On February 2, 2010, Maurer pleaded guilty, pursuant 
to a written plea agreement, to a one-count information 
alleging that he possessed child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).  At his plea hearing, Maurer 
admitted that he “knowingly possess[ed] . . . . more than 600 
images of child pornography,”1 some of which depicted 
“individuals who were clearly minors that had not attained the 
age of 12 . . . engaging in sexually explicit conduct with other 
minors and adults.”  (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 36-37.)  
Maurer additionally admitted that “possession of these images 
involve[d] the use of a computer.”  (Id. at 36.)  These 
admissions were mirrored in the plea agreement, which also 
contained a waiver of Maurer‟s right to appeal the District 
Court‟s acceptance of the stipulations contained therein and 
an acknowledgment that the District Court was not bound by 
them.  (Id. at 22, 26.)   
                                              
1
  For purposes of determining the number of images, 
each video or similar visual depiction is equivalent to 75 
images of child pornography.  U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 
4(B)(ii).  Maurer admitted to possessing more than 600 
images based on the application of this conversion formula.   
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The District Court held a sentencing hearing on June 
28, 2010.  According to the PSR prepared by the United 
States Probation Office, Maurer‟s total offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines was 28, and his criminal history 
category was I, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 78 to 
97 months of imprisonment.  Notably, the Probation Office 
found that Maurer‟s offense involved material that portrayed 
“sadistic or other violent conduct,” and therefore 
recommended application of a four level enhancement set 
forth in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).  (PSR ¶ 23.)  The Probation 
Office relied on dictionary definitions of these terms to 
determine the applicability of this four level enhancement.  
(Id. ¶ 23 n.2.)  Although Maurer stipulated to conduct 
providing the basis for sentencing enhancements relating to 
his use of a computer and possession of images depicting 
prepubescent minors, he did not stipulate to possession of 
images depicting sadistic or violent conduct.  Prior to 
sentencing, Maurer objected to the application of § 
2G2.2(b)(4) recommended in the PSR, contending that “the 
material described in paragraph 23 is [in]sufficient for the 
enhancement to apply nor does it seem to meet the definitions 
provided in footnote 2 of the report.”  (Id. Addendum.) 
  
During his sentencing hearing, Maurer presented 
arguments against the application of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and 
requested a downward variance based on the factors set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court denied Maurer‟s 
objection to the four level enhancement authorized by § 
2G2.2(b)(4), stating that “[w]ithout question I think that‟s an 
enhancement that is applicable and has been appropriately 
applied.”  (J.A. at 67.)  The District Court further explained, 
“I do think that [the enhancement] is appropriately applied . . 
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. because to indicate that children being essentially molested, 
raped and tortured is not sadistic or somehow masochistic, I 
think it strains credibility to make that argument. . . . [a]nd 
this case is certainly no different, given the videos that were 
involved, the photos that were involved.”  (Id.)  The District 
Court then proceeded to calculate Maurer‟s total offense level 
as 28 and his criminal history category as I, yielding a 
Guidelines sentence range of 78 to 97 months, consistent with 
the PSR.  Upon considering Maurer‟s arguments pertaining to 
the sentencing objectives set forth in § 3553(a), the District 
Court granted a downward variance and sentenced Maurer to 
sixty months of imprisonment, followed by a five-year term 
of supervised release.   
  
The District Court included several special conditions 
as part of Maurer‟s five-year term of supervised release.  
Only two are relevant to this appeal: (1) a prohibition on 
“possess[ing], procur[ing], purchas[ing], or otherwise 
obtain[ing] access to any form of computer network, bulletin 
board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers 
unless specifically approved by the U.S. Probation Office,” 
with disputes regarding applicability “to be decided by the 
court”; and (2) a prohibition on “having any contact with 
children of either sex, under the age of 18, without the 
expressed approval of the U.S. Probation Office . . . [and 
from] obtain[ing] employment or perform[ing] volunteer 
work which includes, as part of its job/work description, 
contact with minor children without the expressed approval of 
the U.S. Probation Office.”  (J.A. at 5, 72.)  The District 
Court did not explain the factual basis for imposing these 
conditions.  (Id. at 72.)  Maurer did not object to the length of 
his supervised release term or any of the accompanying 
special conditions specified by the District Court.   
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A timely appeal followed.   
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
We review sentences for both procedural and 
substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 
2010).  To this end, “[w]e must first ensure that the district 
court committed no significant procedural error in arriving at 
its decision,” and if it has not, “we then review the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”  United States v. 
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008).  Alternatively, 
where the alleged error pertains to the district court‟s 
interpretation of the Guidelines, our review is de novo.  See 
id. at 217.  Our review of the District Court‟s findings of fact 
is for clear error.  Id. 
 
We also review a district court‟s decision to impose a 
special condition of supervised release under the abuse of 
discretion standard.  United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 
390 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 
122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Where, however, a defendant fails 
to object to the conditions imposed at sentencing, the district 
court‟s decision is reviewed for plain error.  United States v. 
Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 404 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
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A.  Application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)
2
 
  
Maurer contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion by applying U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) because: (1) 
the enhancement itself is vague and overly broad, evinced by 
the fact that the Probation Office had to reference a dictionary 
to determine whether the enhancement applied; (2) the 
photographs at issue are not “sadistic” or “violent” according 
to the ordinary meaning of those terms; and (3) the 
Government and Probation Office never established that he 
intended to receive the images or that he derived pleasure 
from viewing them.  Maurer also challenges application of 
the enhancement by arguing that the District Court failed to 
give due regard to the written plea agreement.  None of these 
arguments are persuasive.   
 
In our view, § 2G2.2(b)(4) is not vague or overly 
broad, and it clearly encompasses the images and videos 
Maurer possessed.  Under § 2G2.2(b)(4), “[i]f the offense 
involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic 
conduct or other depictions of violence,” a defendant‟s 
offense level is increased by four levels.  U.S.S.G. § 
2G2.2(b)(4).  Although the Sentencing Guidelines do not 
define “sadistic or masochistic conduct” or “depictions of 
                                              
2
  Section 2G2.2(b)(4) was previously identified within 
the Guidelines as § 2G2.2(b)(3).  The present designation 
came into effect on November 1, 2004.  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. 
C, amend. 664 (2010).  For consistency and clarity, 
throughout this opinion we have replaced references to 
subsection “(3)” within quoted excerpts of other opinions 
with “([4]).”  
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violence,” we believe that the ordinary meaning of these 
terms provides courts with sufficient guidance to ensure that 
the enhancement is appropriately applied to specific and 
identifiable conduct.
3
  See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 
37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory 
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be 
                                              
3
  To date, we have not spoken precedentially on the 
meaning of “sadistic,” “masochistic,” and “violent” as used 
within § 2G2.2(b)(4), or otherwise precisely determined what 
type of depictions warrant application of the four-level 
enhancement provided for in this Guidelines provision.  In 
United States v. Parmelee, we suggested that images 
depicting sexual abuse and bondage of children should have 
compelled a district court to apply the four level 
enhancement, yet we did not elaborate further on the actual 
meaning of the terms within § 2G2.2(b)(4) or the general 
circumstances under which the enhancement should apply.  
See 319 F.3d 583, 585 n.3, 594 (3d Cir. 2003).  In United 
States v. Miller, we briefly commented on the meaning of 
“sadomasochistic” when determining whether a district court 
had correctly concluded that the appellant‟s testimony was 
perjurious.   See 527 F.3d 54, 59, 76-79 (3d Cir. 2008).  Our 
discussion of the term‟s meaning, however, was limited to 
whether it was clear enough to conclude that the defendant 
knowingly gave false testimony when he denied possessing 
images fitting this description.  See id.  Finally, in United 
States v. Grober, we generally discussed the enhancements 
set forth in § 2G2.2(b), including subsection (b)(4), however 
our ruling neither addressed nor resolved the issues before us 
in the instant appeal.  See 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010).  Our 
remaining consideration of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and the terms 
within is limited to non-precedential decisions. 
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interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning.”); United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 268 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 
450, 452 (3d Cir. 1992), for the proposition that “[w]e 
construe terms of the Guidelines according to their plain 
meaning” and relying on a dictionary for this purpose).  
Moreover, other circuits have construed this Guidelines 
provision according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, and 
we too are comfortable following this approach.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 614-15 (9th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 
1996).   
 
Webster‟s Dictionary defines “sadism” as “the 
infliction of pain . . . as a means of obtaining sexual release,” 
“delight in physical or mental cruelty,” and “excessive 
cruelty.”  WEBSTER‟S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1997-98 (1993).  “Masochism,” on 
the other hand, is defined as obtaining “sexual gratification 
through the acceptance of physical abuse or humiliation.”  Id. 
at 1388.  “Violence” is defined primarily as the “exertion of 
any physical force so as to injure or abuse.”  Id. at 2554.  
Although violence, in isolation, can be interpreted broadly, its 
use here immediately follows the more narrow and specific 
terms “sadistic or masochistic conduct,” and thus we are 
compelled to construe its meaning narrowly.  See CSX 
Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 
1113 (2011) (“We typically use ejusdem generis to ensure 
that a general word will not render specific words 
meaningless.”); see also Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 238 (“[T]he 
general term „other depictions of violence‟ casts its net no 
wider than necessary to capture images akin to those included 
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by § 2G2.2(b)([4])‟s more specific terms.”).  Thus, we are 
content that an expansive application of the enhancement is 
not tenable, and we reject Maurer‟s contention that § 
2G2.2(b)(4) is vague and overly broad.
4
 
                                              
4
  Maurer couches his argument that § 2G2.2(b)(4) is 
vague and overbroad in general terms, contending simply that 
these defects render a sentencing court‟s application of this 
provision an abuse of discretion.  Nowhere in his appellate 
brief does he claim that these alleged defects render § 
2G2.2(b)(4) unconstitutionally vague.  To the extent that 
Maurer‟s argument can be construed as a claim of 
unconstitutional vagueness, we similarly reject this claim.   
Given the clarity of the enhancement when interpreted 
according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, we are 
confident that the provision does not fail to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct to which it 
applies.  See United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 319-20 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (considering a claim of constitutional vagueness 
with respect to a specific Guidelines provision and holding 
that the provision was not unconstitutionally vague in part 
because it gave fair notice), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 
408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999).  Similarly, we are confident that the 
enhancement, as written, does not authorize or encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  See United States 
v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
a statute may also be unconstitutionally vague if it “authorizes 
or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 
(2000))). 
Additionally, Maurer cannot show vagueness in light 
of the facts of his specific case.  See United States v. Mazurie, 
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After considering the ordinary meaning of these terms, 
we join other circuits in holding that the application of § 
2G2.2(b)(4) is appropriate where an image depicts sexual 
activity involving a prepubescent minor that would have 
caused pain to the minor.
5
  We believe that this approach is 
                                                                                                     
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (“It is well established that 
vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First 
Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts 
of the case at hand.”); Jones, 979 F.2d at 319-20 (requiring an 
appellant to show vagueness in light of the facts of his 
specific case when alleging that a Guidelines provision was 
unconstitutionally vague).  The images at issue here, which, 
as noted, depicted prepubescent children being bound and 
sexually penetrated by adults, should have put Maurer on 
notice that their possession could trigger the four level 
enhancement in § 2G2.2(b)(4).  See United States v. Rearden, 
349 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[a] person of 
reasonable intelligence would figure that a picture of [a male 
sexually penetrating a child] portrays an adult male‟s pleasure 
at the expense of the child‟s pain.”). 
5
  See United States v. Rodgers, 610 F.3d 975, 978-79 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“We have found that § 2G2.2(b)(4) applies to 
acts likely to cause physical pain.”) (internal citation 
omitted); United States v. Freeman, 578 F.3d 142, 146 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (“[I]f a sentencing court finds that (1) an image 
depicts sexual activity involving a minor and (2) the depicted 
activity would have caused pain to the minor, that court need 
not make any additional findings in order to impose a four-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).”); United 
States v. Belflower, 390 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“[I]mages involving the sexual penetration of a minor girl by 
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consistent with the meaning of § 2G2.2(b)(4) and that it 
provides a sufficiently narrow basis on which sentencing 
courts may determine whether the enhancement applies.  
Moreover, in light of our interpretation of § 2G2.2(b)(4), we 
hold that in order to apply this enhancement, a sentencing 
court need only find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
an image depicts sexual activity involving a prepubescent 
minor and that the depicted activity would have caused pain 
to the minor.  See United States v. Freeman, 578 F.3d 142, 
147-48 (2d Cir. 2009).  We agree with other circuits that it is 
well within the sentencing court‟s discretion and capacity to 
make this finding and that nothing more is required to sustain 
application of the enhancement.  See United States v. Caro, 
309 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases 
                                                                                                     
an adult male and images of an adult male performing anal 
sex on a minor girl or boy are per se sadistic or violent within 
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)([4]).”); Rearden, 349 
F.3d at 616 (“We join these circuits, and hold that the district 
court did not improperly apply § 2G2.2(b)([4]) after finding 
that the images depicted subjection of a child to a sexual act 
that would have to be painful, and thus sadistic.”); United 
States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] 
photograph is sadistic within the meaning of Section 
2G2.2(b)([4]) when it depicts the subjection of a young child 
to a sexual act that would have to be painful.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)); Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 239 
(“[I]t was certainly reasonable for the district court to infer 
that the conduct depicted by the photographs caused the 
children pain, physical or emotional or both, and therefore 
constitutes sadism or violence within the meaning of the 
guideline.”). 
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holding that expert testimony is not required to determine 
whether depicted conduct is “sadistic”); Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 
239 (“[I]t was certainly reasonable for the district court to 
infer that the conduct depicted . . . caused the children pain . . 
. and therefore constitutes sadism or violence within the 
meaning of the guideline.”); Delmarle, 99 F.3d at 83 (“[I]t 
was within the [sentencing] court‟s discretion to conclude that 
the subjection of a young child to a sexual act that would 
have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic 
within the meaning of § 2G2.2(b)([4]).”). 
 
Additionally, contrary to Maurer‟s claim, there is no 
need for the sentencing court to determine whether a 
defendant intended to possess the images or actually derived 
pleasure from viewing them.  Section 2G2.2(b)(4) is applied 
on the basis of strict liability.  See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) 
Application Note 2 (“Subsection (b)(4) applies if the offense 
involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic 
conduct or other depictions of violence, regardless of whether 
the defendant specifically intended to possess, access with 
intent to view, receive, or distribute such materials.”) 
(emphasis added); United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 
840 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[L]iability for receiving violent child 
pornography is strict.  Sentencing enhancements generally are 
imposed on the basis of strict liability rather than of the 
defendant‟s intentions or even his lack of care.”).  Moreover, 
we agree with the Second Circuit that this factual inquiry is 
an objective one, and thus, “[a] sentencing court need not 
determine whether the people depicted in the image are 
deriving sexual pleasure from the infliction of pain; nor need 
it gauge whether the viewer of the picture is likely to derive 
pleasure from the fact that the image displays painful sexual 
acts.”  Freeman, 578 F.3d at 146.  Thus, Maurer‟s contention 
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that the District Court needed to establish that he intended to 
possess or actually derived pleasure from viewing the images 
at issue here is unavailing.   
 
We also note our belief that the application of § 
2G2.2(b)(4) is not limited to circumstances where the pain 
that would result from the depicted conduct is the result of 
sexual penetration by an adult or bondage of a child.
6
  As the 
Fifth Circuit observed in Lyckman, many of the cases 
involving the application of this enhancement involve 
“pornographic images depicting bondage or the insertion of 
foreign objects into the body canals of a child,” but such 
“images hardly exhaust the malevolent universe of sexual 
violence against children.”  See 235 F.3d at 238-39.  Thus, 
although we interpret § 2G2.2(b)(4) as applying to a restricted 
universe of conduct limited by the ordinary meanings of its 
terms, we do not interpret this provision so narrowly as to 
                                              
6
  This position is consistent with precedent in other 
circuits.  For example, the Seventh Circuit determined that § 
2G2.2(b)(4) applies not only to “acts likely to cause physical 
pain,” but also to “sexual gratification which is purposefully 
degrading and humiliating, [and] conduct which causes 
mental suffering or psychological or emotional injury in the 
victim.”  Rodgers, 610 F.3d at 978-79 (internal citations 
omitted).  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit noted that “the terms 
„violence‟ and „sadism,‟ as ordinarily used, are not limited to 
activity involving a rope, belt, whip, chains,” and held that § 
2G2.2(b)(4) applies more broadly to acts that depicted sexual 
gratification resulting from a child‟s pain, irrespective of 
whether those acts specifically involved bondage or sexual 
penetration.  See United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 847 
(2001) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)). 
16 
 
restrict its application to a subset of sadistic and violent acts 
of sexual abuse.  Sentencing courts are free to apply the 
enhancement whenever an image depicts sexual activity 
involving a prepubescent minor that would have caused pain 
to the minor, regardless of the means through which that pain 
would result.   
 
Turning now to the facts of Maurer‟s case, we observe 
that the District Court applied § 2G2.2(b)(4) based upon a 
correct interpretation of the enhancement provision and after 
making the required findings articulated above.  The District 
Court explained, “I do think that [the enhancement] is 
appropriately applied . . . because to indicate that children 
being essentially molested, raped and tortured is not sadistic 
or somehow masochistic, I think it strains credibility to make 
that argument. . . . [a]nd this case is certainly no different, 
given the videos that were involved, the photos that were 
involved.”  (J.A. at 67.)  The images and videos the court 
referred to included the following depictions: “a prepubescent 
. . . male . . . anally penetrated by an older male”; “a 
prepubescent . . . female with her wrist bound to her ankle 
with duct tape”; and an image of “a prepubescent . . . female, 
her legs bound above her head with white rope, with an object 
inserted between her legs.”  (PSR ¶¶ 17, 23.)  Although the 
District Court did not explicitly state that these sexual acts 
would cause pain, it is clear from the District Court‟s 
references to “rape,” “torture,” and “children,” and its 
statement that “this case is certainly no different,” that it 
believed the depicted acts would have caused the children 
pain.  Thus, the District Court‟s decision to apply the four 
level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4) was supported by the 
required findings we articulated above—namely, that the 
images Maurer possessed depicted sexual activity involving a 
17 
 
prepubescent minor that would have caused the child to 
experience pain.  Moreover, the District Court‟s conclusion 
that these acts fit within the meaning of “sadistic” rested on a 
sound interpretation of the enhancement.  Without dwelling 
further on the horrid acts depicted within the pictures and 
videos Maurer possessed, we will simply express our belief 
that it does indeed “strain[] credibility” to argue that these 
actions are not “sadistic” within the ordinary meaning of that 
term.  Accordingly, the District Court did not misinterpret the 
meaning of the enhancement, commit a procedural error, or 
otherwise abuse its discretion in applying § 2G2.2(b)(4) based 
on the facts of Maurer‟s offense.  Therefore, we hold that the 
District Court properly applied the four level enhancement.   
 
We also find no merit in Maurer‟s contention that the 
court abused its discretion by accepting the plea agreement 
and then making additional factual findings beyond those 
factual stipulations provided within it.  The agreement itself 
explicitly states that “[t]his agreement to stipulate . . . cannot 
and does not bind the sentencing judge, who may make 
independent factual findings and may reject any or all of the 
stipulations entered into by the parties.”  (J.A. at 22.)  
Moreover, we have previously held that “[a] sentencing court 
is not bound by factual stipulations in a plea agreement and 
has discretion to make factual findings based on other 
relevant information.”  United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 
789, 792 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  Nothing in the 
record indicates, nor does Maurer allege, that the agreement 
was anything less than knowing and voluntary.  Thus, 
18 
 
although the District Court accepted the plea agreement, it 
was not thereafter limited by it.
7
  See id.   
 
Finally, the record clearly demonstrates that the 
District Court meaningfully considered Maurer‟s sentencing 
arguments, weighed the sentencing factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Maurer to a term of 
imprisonment that was reasonable in light of his offense. 
 
B.  Special Conditions of Supervised Release 
 
Maurer also challenges two of the special conditions 
imposed by the District Court as part of his five-year term of 
supervised release.  As previously explained, these special 
conditions prohibited Maurer: (1) from “possess[ing], 
                                              
7
  We note that in the plea agreement, the Government 
never agreed to recommend a specific Guidelines range, nor 
did it provide any assurance that it would advocate for a 
sentence within the range yielded by the factual stipulations 
set forth in the agreement.  Furthermore, the plea agreement 
explicitly provided: “The sentencing judge may impose any 
reasonable sentence up to and including the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment. . . . This Office cannot and 
does not make any representation or promise as to what 
guideline range may be found by the sentencing judge, or as 
to what sentence Derl H. Maurer ultimately will receive.”  
(J.A. at 20.)  In light of this and other provisions, Maurer is 
hard pressed to argue that the District Court‟s acceptance of 
the agreement gave rise to an obligation that it sentence him 
within a range limited by the factual stipulations set forth 
therein.   
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procur[ing], purchas[ing], or otherwise obtain[ing] access to 
any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or 
exchange format involving computers unless specifically 
approved by the U.S. Probation Office,” with disputes 
regarding applicability “to be decided by the court”8; and (2) 
“from having any contact with children of either sex, under 
the age of 18, without the expressed approval of the U.S. 
Probation Office . . . [and from] obtain[ing] employment or 
perform[ing] volunteer work which includes, as part of its 
job/work description, contact with minor children without the 
expressed approval of the U.S. Probation Office.”  (J.A. at 5.)  
Maurer contends that the limitation on internet use is unduly 
restrictive given that he neither contacted a minor for sex nor 
had a prior record of doing so.  Maurer similarly argues that 
the prohibition on contact with minors is unsupported by the 
facts underlying his offense of conviction and that the 
condition amounts to an excessive delegation of authority to 
the Office of Probation.  Because Maurer did not object to the 
District Court‟s imposition of these special conditions at the 
sentencing hearing, we review for plain error.
9
  Heckman, 592 
F.3d at 404.   
                                              
8
  Hereinafter we will refer generally to this condition as 
a restriction on “internet” use.  Notably, the condition at issue 
here is distinct from and more narrow than a restriction on 
“computer” use, which would bar a defendant from accessing 
both computers and the internet.  
9
  We use a four-prong analysis to determine whether the 
district court committed plain error.  An appellant must show: 
(1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain; (3) the 
error affected the defendant‟s substantial rights; and (4) the 
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Olano, 
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Although sentencing judges have broad discretion in 
fashioning special conditions of supervised release, this 
discretion is not without limit.  Id. at 405.  Sentencing courts 
must exercise this discretion within the parameters of 18 
U.S.C. § 3583, which requires that any special conditions be 
“reasonably related” to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).
10
  18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)-(d).  Moreover, any such 
condition must impose “no greater deprivation of liberty than 
is reasonably necessary” to deter future criminal conduct, 
protect the public, and rehabilitate the defendant.  18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d)(2); see United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248-
49 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the considerations included in § 
3583 by the incorporation of § 3553(a) “are fairly broad, but 
                                                                                                     
507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993).  “A plainly erroneous condition 
of supervised release will inevitably affect substantial rights, 
as a defendant who fails to meet that condition will be subject 
to further incarceration.”  United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 
241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005).  Moreover, imposing a sentence not 
authorized by law “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, 
and reputation of the proceedings.”  Id.  Thus, if we find that 
the District Court plainly erred in imposing this supervised 
release condition, we must vacate the condition. 
10
  Those factors include: “(1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; [and] (2) the need for the 
sentence imposed . . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant 
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, 
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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they do impose a real restriction on the district court‟s 
freedom to impose conditions on supervised release.”).11   
 
B.1.  Special Condition Restricting Internet Access 
 
We have previously identified several key 
considerations when addressing challenges to special 
conditions restricting internet and computer use.  In United 
States v. Heckman, we explained that “three factors [] have 
guided our prior holdings in this area: (1) the length and (2) 
                                              
11
  We also observe that, “courts of appeals have 
consistently required district courts to set forth factual 
findings to justify special probation conditions,” United 
States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); however, 
“[w]here a sentencing court fails to adequately explain its 
reasons for imposing a condition of supervised release or the 
condition‟s relationship to the applicable sentencing factors, 
we may nevertheless affirm the condition if we can „ascertain 
any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the record before the 
District Court . . . on our own.‟”  United States v. Voelker, 
489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Warren, 186 F.3d 
at 367).  Although Maurer does not discuss this requirement 
in his appellate brief, our independent review of the record 
reveals that the District Court failed to explain the factual 
underpinnings of the special conditions it imposed.  We do 
not believe that this defect requires that we vacate these 
conditions, however, as we are able to identify a viable basis 
for their imposition.  See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144.  The 
nature of Maurer‟s computer use, the character and size of his 
child pornography collection, and his stated sexual interest in 
minors provide ample grounds for imposition of these special 
conditions.  
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coverage of the imposed ban; and, (3) the defendant‟s 
underlying conduct.”  592 F.3d at 405.  Consistent with this 
approach, in United States v. Miller, we explained: “First, we 
must examine the scope of the supervised release condition, 
including both its duration and its substantive breadth—here, 
the degree to which access to computers and the internet is 
restricted. . . . Second, we must consider the severity of the 
defendant‟s criminal conduct and the facts underlying the 
conviction, with a particular focus on whether the defendant 
used a computer or the internet to solicit or otherwise 
personally endanger children.”  594 F.3d 172, 187 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Although these factors provide a helpful framework 
for analyzing the challenge presented here, we remain 
cognizant of the reality that “this is an area of law that 
requires a fact-specific analysis.”  See Heckman, 592 F.3d at 
405. 
 
Maurer argues that the circumstances of his offense, 
when considered in light of the factors highlighted above and 
compared to other cases in our circuit dealing with similar 
challenges, require that we vacate the special condition 
restricting his use of the internet.  In support of this position, 
Maurer places considerable emphasis on the fact that his use 
of the internet did not involve sexual exploitation of an 
individual who was actually a minor.  Indeed, as noted above, 
the presence or absence of such conduct has been an 
important factor in previous decisions of this Court wherein 
we considered the reasonableness of restrictions on internet 
and computer use.  See Miller, 594 F.3d at 187.  For example, 
in United States v. Crandon, we upheld a three-year ban on 
internet use because the defendant “used the Internet as a 
means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young 
girl.”  173 F.3d 122, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).  Similarly, in 
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United States v. Thielemann, we upheld a computer 
restriction where a defendant, in addition to possessing child 
pornography, encouraged another person through an online 
“chat” to have sexual contact with a young girl.  575 F.3d 
265, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2009).  In contrast, in United States v. 
Voelker, we struck down a lifetime ban on computer use 
given its “extraordinary breadth” and because the defendant 
“did not use his computer equipment to seek out minors nor 
did he attempt to set up any meetings with minors over the 
internet.”  489 F.3d at 144, 146.  Thus, Maurer is correct that 
in addition to considering the length and breadth of such 
restrictions, our analysis looks to whether or not the 
defendant used the computer and internet to engage in 
predatory behavior.   
 
Contrary to Maurer‟s position, however, our 
consideration of this factor as well as its underlying concerns 
actually militate in favor of upholding the restriction on his 
use of the internet.  Although Maurer did not in this particular 
instance use the internet to exploit a person that was actually 
a minor, his use of the internet nonetheless triggers concerns 
of predation that we believe are sufficient to sustain the 
restriction at issue here.  While “Nate” was, insofar as Maurer 
knew, eighteen years old and therefore not a minor, Maurer 
explicitly stated via an internet message that he was interested 
in “young guys too your age and under.”  (PSR ¶ 10 
(emphasis added).)  Moreover, Maurer was clearly willing to 
use the internet to facilitate a sexual encounter.  He directed 
“Nate” to a website featuring images of himself engaging in 
sexual acts and later expressed a desire “to meet and have 
some good fun together.”  (Id. ¶ 16.)  These facts, when 
viewed together, demonstrate that Maurer‟s use of the internet 
went beyond simply obtaining child pornography.  Maurer‟s 
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expressed interest in minors, when coupled with his 
demonstrated willingness to use the internet as a means for 
arranging sexual encounters, presents a tangible risk to 
children.  This risk exists notwithstanding the fact that “Nate” 
was eighteen years old insofar as Maurer knew at the time.  
Thus, although Maurer did not actually use the internet to 
seek out a minor in this particular instance, we believe that 
the unique facts of his offense trigger the very concerns that 
animated our consideration of the solicitation and predation 
concerns highlighted in Miller.  See 594 F.3d at 187. 
 
We also believe that the duration and scope of the 
restriction on internet use are reasonable.  While there is no 
precise formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable 
length of time, five years falls comfortably within the range 
of time periods we have previously upheld.  See, e.g., 
Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 270, 278 (upholding a special 
condition lasting for ten years); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125, 
127-28 (upholding a special condition lasting for three years).  
Although Maurer is an older man, his age was not an obstacle 
to committing the instant offense, and we do not believe his 
age renders a five-year restriction excessive.  The scope of the 
restriction is also sufficiently narrow.  Rather than restricting 
all computer use, the District Court limited only Maurer‟s 
access to the internet, with exceptions to be provided by the 
Probation Office.  Once released, Maurer may still use a 
computer for daily tasks.  Thus, this restriction does not 
amount to “cybernetic banishment,” as did the condition in 
Voelker, 489 F.3d at 148, and it is more akin to the 
sufficiently narrow internet-only conditions we affirmed in 
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Crandon and Theilemann.
12
  See 575 F.3d 278-79; 173 F.3d 
at 127-128.
 
  Furthermore, the District Court expressly stated 
at sentencing that disputes regarding the applicability of the 
restrictions would be “decided by the court.”  (J.A. at 72.) 
 
The restriction on internet use therefore shares a nexus 
to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public and 
does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is 
necessary in this case.  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
plainly err in imposing this condition. 
 
B.2.  Special Condition Restricting Association with 
Minors 
 
We also reject Maurer‟s contention that the restriction 
on contact with minors is overly broad and amounts to an 
excessive delegation of authority to the Office of Probation.  
As discussed above, in the course of a conversation with 
“Nate” wherein Maurer ultimately suggested meeting for a 
                                              
12
  Our explanation in Thielemann is equally applicable 
here.  Therein, we acknowledged that “[c]omputers and 
Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the 
modern world.”  575 F.3d at 278 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Nonetheless, we found the restriction on 
internet use appropriate given the fact that the defendant 
could “own or use a personal computer as long as it is not 
connected to the internet; thus he is allowed to use word 
processing programs and other benign software.  Further, he 
may seek permission from the Probation Office to use the 
internet during the term of his ten-year restriction, which is a 
far cry from the unyielding lifetime restriction in Voelker.”  
Id. 
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sexual encounter, Maurer stated that he had a sexual interest 
in minors.  Moreover, his substantial collection of child 
pornography contained a number of images that depicted 
sadistic and violent sexual abuse of prepubescent children.  
These facts, taken together, suggest that Maurer is a risk to 
children, and therefore the District Court did not plainly err in 
restricting his contact with minors, regardless of the fact that 
he was convicted only for possession of child pornography.  
See United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254, 268 (3d Cir. 
2001) (upholding a special condition restricting contact with 
minors where defendant was convicted solely of possessing 
child pornography, but where other facts in the record 
indicated that defendant was a danger to children).  Given the 
risk Maurer presents, we believe that this special condition 
shares a nexus to the goals of deterrence and protection of the 
public and does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty 
than is necessary in this case. 
 
Finally, we do not believe that this restriction, which 
permits the Probation Office to approve exceptions, amounts 
to an excessive delegation of authority.  “Probation officers 
have broad statutory authority to advise and supervise 
probationers, and to „perform any other duty that the court 
may designate.‟”  Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
3603(10)).  However, because probation officers are 
nonjudicial officers, they may not “decide the nature or extent 
of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.”  Id.  (citation 
omitted).  We think that the special condition restricting 
Maurer‟s contact with children delegates authority to 
probation that is in accord with the Probation Office‟s 
ministerial role.  
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Maurer points us to our decisions in Heckman and 
Voelker in arguing that the condition restricting his contact 
with minors is an improper delegation of authority.  Both of 
these cases, however, are distinguishable.  In Heckman, we 
vacated a condition of supervised release which required the 
defendant to “follow the directions of the United States 
Probation Office regarding any contact with children of either 
sex under the age of 18.”  592 F.3d at 411.  We interpreted 
this condition as delegating complete discretion over 
Heckman‟s contact with minors to the Probation Office and 
therefore concluded that the condition was improper.  Id.   In 
contrast, the condition at issue here sufficiently defines the 
contours of the prohibition, as it specifically prohibits “any 
contact with children of either sex, under the age of 18,” 
rather than leaving to probation the primary determination of 
which children, if any, Maurer may associate with.  (J.A. at 5 
(emphasis added).)  The fact that Probation may nonetheless 
determine exceptions does not amount to an impermissible 
delegation, as the nature and extent of the punishment 
remains predetermined by the District Court.   
 
In Voelker, we vacated as an “unbridled delegation of 
authority” a condition with specific terms that more closely 
resemble the terms of the condition imposed in Maurer‟s 
case.
13
  489 F.3d at 154.  Maurer contends that our holding in 
Voelker compels the same outcome here.  We disagree.  Our 
decision in Voelker was driven by two critical facts that are 
                                              
13
  The condition in Voelker read as follows: “The 
defendant shall not associate with children under the age of 
18 except in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware 
of the defendant‟s background and current offense and who 
has been approved by the probation officer.”  489 F.3d at 143. 
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not present in the case before us.  First, Voelker had two 
young children.  Id. at 153.  Second, the special condition 
barring contact with minors was of lifetime duration.  Id. at 
146.  Thus, by imposing a general prohibition with exceptions 
to be provided by probation, the sentencing court delegated to 
Voelker‟s probation officer the “sole authority for deciding if 
[he] will ever have unsupervised contact with any minor, 
including his own children, for the rest of his life.”  Id. at 154.  
Moreover, the record in Voelker‟s case prevented us from 
supplying a presumption that the condition would not apply to 
Voelker‟s own children.  Id.   
 
Whereas the condition at issue in Voelker infringed 
upon the relationship with the defendant‟s own children, 
Maurer‟s condition is of more limited effect given his age and 
circumstances.  Each of Maurer‟s children is an adult.  Thus, 
the restriction on association with minors does not trigger the 
concern that animated our determination in Voelker.  
Moreover, whereas the condition in Voelker was of lifetime 
duration, the condition at issue here lasts only five years.  
Absent the unique concerns present in Voelker, we do not find 
that the condition restricting Maurer‟s association with 
children amounts to an excessive delegation of authority.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm Maurer‟s 
sentence and the two challenged special conditions of 
supervised release. 
